<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Time Pressure | Jingkai Hong</title><link>https://jingkaihong.netlify.app/tag/time-pressure/</link><atom:link href="https://jingkaihong.netlify.app/tag/time-pressure/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><description>Time Pressure</description><generator>Wowchemy (https://wowchemy.com)</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><item><title>Framing Sensitivity under Resource Constraints: When and How Time Pressure and Cognitive Load Influence Choice</title><link>https://jingkaihong.netlify.app/publication/hong_2025x/</link><pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://jingkaihong.netlify.app/publication/hong_2025x/</guid><description>&lt;!--
abstract
Decision-making often occurs under conditions of limited cognitive resources and stringent time constraints. However, it remains unclear whether and when these con-straints affect preferences, and if so, why. The current research used three online studies to compare how time pressure and cognitive load separately and jointly influence gain/loss framing sensitivity in risky choices, a phenomenon that has demonstrated sensitivity to cognitive resource constraints in past work. Participants completed a gamble selection task, choosing between a sure option framed as a gain or loss and a probabilistic gam-ble, while experiencing manipulations of cognitive load (low vs. high) and time pressure (varying amounts of time to make the choice). Consistent with prior literature, we ob-served robust gain/loss framing effects: participants were more risk averse under gain frames and more risk seeking under loss frames. Severe time pressure (e.g., a 1-second decision window) intensified these framing effects, suggesting that constraining decision time increases reliance on intuitive, frame-dependent heuristics. This effect declined and vanished entirely under more moderate time pressure constraints. Cognitive load, how-ever, did not significantly alter framing sensitivity, even though evidence suggested that it reduced available cognitive resources and sped up response times in no-time-pressure conditions. These findings indicate that while both time pressure and cognitive load limit cognitive resources, and perhaps through similar mechanisms (i.e., reducing the time spent on choice), these limits must generally be quite severe to influence behaviour. The results highlight important distinctions in how common resource constraints influ-ence the construction and expression of preferences, informing both theoretical models of decision-making under constraints and practical interventions aimed at improving deci-sion quality.
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Preparing for submission to &lt;em>Journal of Experimental Psychology General&lt;/em>.
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